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1951] DONNER ET AL. v. CALVERT
accord with prior statement of the law in Maryland, there
seems little basis in principle for denying relief on this set
of facts4 merely for lack of some technical evidence of a
specific intent to benefit the plaintiff.
DISTINCTION BETWEEN CIVIL AND
CRIMINAL CONTEMPT
Donner et al. v. Calvert Distillers Corp.'
On January 28, 1948 the Calvert Distillers Corp. obtained
a decree from the Circuit Court for Anne Arundel County
that permanently enjoined Hillard Donner and the Mills
Cut Rate Liquor Mart, Inc. from selling the plaintiff's whis-
key at prices below those set by the plaintiff with Maryland
retailers by contract under the authority of the Maryland
Fair Trade Act. Subsequently, the liquor license held by
the Mills Cut Rate Liquor Mart, Inc. was reissued to Hillard
Donner and to Joseph Donner. On January 3, 1949 the
plaintiff filed a petition in the case, alleging a violation of
the decree by the defendants, and on March 3, 1949 the
defendants were judged in contempt and fined $250. On
December 10, 1949 the plaintiff filed a second contempt peti-
tion, which resulted in an order holding both Hillard Don-
"See A. L. R., supra, n. 8, that:
"It Is not always quite clear what is meant when the courts say that
the 'intention' of the parties is controlling. There does not seem to be
any basis for holding that, although a performance of the contract will
necessarily and directly benefit the third person, his remedy depends
upon an Intention on the part of the parties to the contract that he
shall have the right to sue thereon. While the Intention of the parties
controls In the creation of rights under the contract, and in determining
the things required by the contract to be done by the parties, it would
seem that, once the right Is created or the duty Is imposed In favor of
the third person, the law furnishes the remedy, regardless of the Inten-
tion of the parties in respect thereof."
The principal case is cited with apparent approval In Acme Brick Co. v.
Hamilton, 238 S. W. 2d 658, 660 (Ark., 1951). There the A construction
company contracted with the B brick company, A to buy and B to sell cer-
tain 'bricks required by A to build homes. A was building a home for C,
and told C to visit B's showroom and pick out the type brick which C wanted
used in the home. C did this, but B delivered the wrong color brick, which
was placed in the house by A. In a suit by C against both A and B, B de-
fended on the basis of the Marlboro case, that C was not In privity of con-
tract with B, and was only an incidental beneficiary under B's contract
with A. The court distinguished -this case from the Maryland one, holding
that reliance by C here on the contract between A and B was more than
incidental, and that C could recover.
177 A. 2d 305 (Md. 1950).
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ner and Joseph Donner in contempt, and imposing fines on
both. The Mills Cut Rate Liquor Mart, Inc. was not held,
as the court found it was no longer in business. From this
order the individual defendants appealed. The Court of
Appeals affirmed as to Hillard Donner and reversed as to
Joseph, the reversal being on the grounds that Joseph had
not violated the injunctive order. In affirming Hillard's
conviction, the court carefully distinguished between crimi-
nal and civil contempt in holding that the defendant was
guilty of the former.
The difference between criminal and civil contempt
raises various problems that are both difficult and of con-
siderably more than academic importance to petitioner, con-
temnor, and the court itself.2
Some of the problems rising out of this distinction have
been eliminated in Maryland by statute.3 Nevertheless, a
variety of situations remains where the difference is signifi-
cant indeed. For example, if a contempt order has been
handed down for violation of an injunction, and on appeal
the injunction was held to be improperly granted, the con-
tempt order will fall if the contempt is civil, but will stand
if the contempt is criminal.4
The difference basically is one of purpose. If the purpose
of the contempt order is punitive, the contempt is criminal;
if the purpose of the contempt order is remedial, the con-
tempt is civil. This, then, is the test - one easier to state
than to apply. The leading Maryland case distinguishing
between criminal and civil contempt is Kelly v. Montebello
Park Co.,5 where the defendants had been enjoined from
building a garage. They nevertheless proceeded with the
construction, and were then held in contempt and fined.
The court found that their contempt was criminal in nature
and quoted with approval the following differentiation be-
tween criminal and civil contempt set forth by Judge San-
born in In Re Nevitt,6 where it was held that a contempt
2 For a list of these possible problems see CHArnE, SIMPSON AND MALONEY,
CASES ON EQurrY (3rd ed. 1951), 31, 32, n. 22.
8 It seems that the issue of appealability in Maryland Is no longer depen-
dent on the criminal or civil distinction in contempt, as all contempt orders
were made appealable by statute subsequent to the Kelly case, infra, n. 5.
Md. Code Supp. (1947), Art. 5, Sec. 107. Construed in Baltimore Radio Show
v. State, 67 A. 2d 497 (Md., 1949), cert. den. 338 U. S. 912 (1950). Also see
Invernizzi and Kaiser, Conflict8 Between Statute8 and Rule8 a8 to Time for
Appeal, 11 Md. L. Rev. 325, 333 (1950).
'See Worden v. Searls, 121 U. S. 14, 25 (1887) ; Salvage Process Corp. v.
Acme Tank Cleaning Process Corp., 86 F. 2d 727 (2nd Cir., 1936).
141 Md. 194, 118 A. 600, 28 A. L. R. 33 (1922).0 117 F. 448, 458, 459 (8th Cir., 1902).
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order jailing two judges until they should comply with a
writ of mandamus was clearly one of civil contempt:
"Proceedings for contempts are of two classes, -
those prosecuted to preserve the power and vindicate
the dignity of the courts, and to punish for disobedience
of their orders, and those instituted to preserve and
enforce the rights of private parties to suits, and to
compel obedience to orders and decrees made to en-
force the rights and administer the remedies to which
the court has found them to be entitled. The former are
criminal and punitive in their nature, and the govern-
ment, the courts and the people are interested in their
prosecution. The latter are civil, remedial and coercive
in their nature, and the parties chiefly in interest in
their conduct and prosecution are the individuals
whose private rights and remedies they were instituted
to protect or enforce.... A criminal contempt involves
no element of personal injury. It is directed against
the power and dignity of the court, and private parties
have little if any interest in the proceedings for its
punishment. But if the contempt consists in the refusal
of a party or a person to do an act which the court has
ordered him to do for the benefit or advantage of a
party to a suit.., and he is committed until he complies
with the order, the commitment is in the nature of an
execution to enforce the judgment of the court, and the
party in whose favor that judgment was rendered is the
real party in interest in the proceedings."
In holding the two judges guilty of civil, not criminal
contempt, the opinion succinctly expressed the whole idea
of civil contempt: "They are imprisoned only until they
comply with the orders of the court, and this they may
do at any time. They carry the keys of their prison in their
own pockets."7
Judge Sanborn's distinction in the Nevitt case was
quoted and relied upon by the Supreme Court in Bessette
v. Conkey Co.' Here the defendant was not an original
party to the injunction suit, but had knowledge of the re-
straining order obtained, which he violated. He was found
in contempt and fined $250. This was held to be criminal
contempt, as the order was punitive. In its opinion the court
noted that often it would be extremely difficult to tell if a
Ibid, 461 ; quoted in Kelly v. Montebello Park Co., supra, n. 5, 200.
6194 U. S. 324, 328 (1904).
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proceeding was punitive or remedial, and that many con-
tempts were in fact both.
The Kelly decision also discussed at length the leading
case of Gompers v. Bucks Stove and Range Co."° Here,
Samuel Gompers and several other Union leaders had been
imprisoned for violation of an injunction arising out of a
labor dispute. The Supreme Court reversed on the ground
that the defendants were guilty of civil contempt, while the
sentences had been entered as if the proceedings were for
criminal contempt. Again the punitive or remedial test was
applied, but here the court elaborated on the theme, point-
ing out that often the plaintiff's petition will furnish a key
to the problem of determining whether the court order in
fact was punitive or remedial. The petitioner here had
prayed for further relief in the nature of a compensatory
fine payable to the petitioner, and the court held that this
was "significant and determinative", as indicating that the
object of the proceeding was for relief, not for punishment
or vindication of the court.
It should be observed that the courts do not always seem
willing to apply the distinction that is the subject of this
note. In Cassidy v. Puett Electrical Starting Gate Corp.,
for example, an appeal was taken from an injunctive order
and from a contempt decree. While holding that the injunc-
tion was improper, the court affirmed the contempt sen-
tence. As to criminal and civil contempt, the court sug-
gested that the distinction was "subtle, and, too often,
tenuous". 2 However, the language of the lower court
clearly showed that the contempt was in fact criminal by
the use of such phrases as "in order to maintain its (the
court's) authority" and "to punish those who have - dis-
obeyed those orders". Thus, it was proper that the contempt
decree remain, regardless of the holding that the injunction
was wrongly issued.
The distinction was criticized in In Re Lee,8 where the
Court of Appeals said: "This classification (into criminal
and civil contempt) has been the source of confusion and
misunderstanding resulting in extensive litigation. Never-
theless, they are so recognized by this court."'
4
1 An illustration of possible confusion in the distinction arises in alimony
cases; see Dickey v. Dickey, 154 Md. 675, 681, 141 A. 387 (1928) ; Bushman
v. Bushman, 157 Md. 166, 145 A. 488 (1929).
10 221 U. S. 418 (1911).
11182 F. 2d 604 (4th Cir., 1950).
12 Ibid, p. 607.
170 Md. 43, 47, 183 A. 560 (1936).
,Other Maryland cases subsequent to the Kelly case recognizing the dis-
.tinction are: Emergency Hospital v. Stevens, 146 Md. 159, 126 A. 101 (1924) ;
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The court in the instant case discusses the contempt pro-
ceedings involved in United States v. United Mine Workers
of America.'5 Here the District Court for the District
of Columbia fined John L. Lewis $10,000 and the Union
$3,500,000 for contempt. The Supreme Court sustained
Lewis' fine and conviction, but divided the United Mine
Workers' fine into two parts, of $700,000 for criminal con-
tempt and of $2,800,000 for civil contempt. The latter was
to be coercive, and was conditional, being payable only if
the miners refused to go back to work. Here again the dis-
tinction was made along the familiar grounds of punish-
ment and remedy. This case is especially important in that
it demonstrates that both types of contempt often are
present in the same proceedings, and that the differentia-
tion is a vital one; for had it been held that the injunc-
tion should not have been issued because of the Norris-
LaGuardia Act, the civil contempt conviction would have
been reversed, but the criminal contempt conviction would
have remained, as a punishment for the United Mine
Workers' flouting of the court's authority. 6
This decision is extremely interesting insofar as it shows
three separate approaches to the problem of the two types
of contempt. Justices Black and Douglas, concurring in
part and dissenting in part, agreed with the majority as to
the imposition of the coercive fine for the civil contempt,
but dissented from the judgment imposing the fine for
criminal contempt. 7 They urged that the object of the
court was merely to compel obedience so that the fines
imposed by the lower court should have been made entirely
conditional and not split; that "in contempt proceedings
courts should never exercise more than 'the least possible
power adequate to the end proposed'."'" Pursuing this line
of reasoning, Justices Black and Douglas felt that criminal
punishment should be invoked only if the defendants should
persist in disobedience of the court order.
A further strongly worded dissent by Justice Rutledge,
with Justice Murphy concurring, urged that neither the
Ex Parte Sturm, 152 Md. 114, 136 A. 312 (1927) ; Ex Parte Bowles, 164 Md.
318, 165 A. 169 (1933) ; see also Wingert v. Kieffer, 29 F. 2d 59 (4th Cir.,
1928). For an excellent critical analysis of the distinction see 5 Minn. L.
Rev. 459 (1921).
1 3 30 U. S. 258 (1947). See 15 U. of Chi. L. Rev. 202-209 (1947) ; 45 Mich.
L. Rev. 469 (1947).
1"Ibid, 330 U. S. 258 (1947) ; see also the concurring opinion of Justice
Frankfurter, 307.
17Ibid, 330 U. S. 258, 328 (1947).
"Ibid, 332, citing Anderson v. Dunn, 6 Wheat. (U.S.) 204, 231 (1821) and
In Re Michael, 326 U. S. 224, 227 (1945).
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fines for criminal contempt nor the fines for civil contempt
should have been imposed, and that to combine the prosecu-
tion of both civil and criminal contempts in one proceeding
was repugnant to the Constitution.
Thus, we see in one case a wide disparity of views, not
so much as to the basic distinction between criminal and
civil contempt, but rather as to the method and timing of the
application of the two procedures, as well as to the consti-
tutionality of such an intermingling of civil and criminal
procedure in one action, with the result that seven justices
regarded the civil contempt fine as proper, five justices
regarded both the civil and criminal contempt penalties as
proper, and two justices felt that neither should have been
imposed. 9
The overall legal theory behind contempt is based on
the desire to uphold the dignity and authority of the court
and the necessity of doing so. Thus, theoretically all con-
tempts, regardless of their exact nature, could be made
punishable, as they are a flouting of the court's express
orders or desires. The historical evolution of the law of
contempt shows that all of the roots are grounded in the
punitive process, pure and simple. There was punishment
for either contempt of the king, or of the king's seal in
the hands of his representatives. The remedial process did
not appear until the time when the chancery courts attained
more prominence, and when, with the increase of chancery
business, came the practical need for coerciveness, in cases
where mere punishment was unsatisfactory. 20
The distinction having developed, the separate devices
of civil and criminal contempt orders continue as means
looking to different ends. So, if in the eyes of the court the
situation presents the necessity of punishment, the pro-
ceedings will be criminal. If, on the other hand, the need
is for coerciveness, the courts will subordinate the idea of
punishment for disobedience, in order to get the desired
results. Thus, the pivotal point of the distinction has been
placed on the nature of the proceedings, i.e., are they
remedial or punitive, and not on the nature of the act of
contempt itself. Though there are many indicia pointing
to either criminal or civil contempt, they are indicia only,
pointing to the probable result.2 The test remains - what
is the purpose of the decree?
See 45 Mich. L. Rev. 469 (1947).
2 For an excellent short history of contempt, criminal and civil, see Beale,
Contempt of Court, criminal and Civil, 21 Harv. L. Rev. 161 (1908).
2See Moskovitz, contempt of Injunction8, Civil and Criminal, 43 Col. L.
Rev. 780 (1943).
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Despite the criticisms sometimes made of the distinction
between civil and criminal contempt, this distinction gives
to the courts a practical tool, enabling them to apply pres-
sure in the desired direction. At the same time, both coer-
cion and punishment can be achieved by convicting the con-
temnor of both civil and criminal contempt. Then, should
the injunction prove on appeal to have been improperly
granted, the civil contempt would fall, but the criminal
would remain as a punishment for the denial of the court's
authority. This, as stated above, was the approach used in
the proceedings against the United Mine Workers.2
Moreover, coercion rather than punishment may fre-
quently be the primary objective of the petitioner. The
framing of prayers asking for relief often may be an im-
portant factor in the court's decision as to whether the
purpose of the decree should be remedial or punitive, a
point well illustrated in the Gompers case."
The distinction has the disadvantage that the contemnor
often is to a large extent unaware of which short of con-
tempt he is guilty, until the decree has been handed down.
Also, it is very often extremely difficult to decide if an
order is in fact, punitive, remedial or both. Thus there is a
certain fluidity that thrusts a vexing interpretive problem
into the picture.24
A more serious aspect, which the distinction does little
to clarify or ameliorate, is the danger of placing too much
power in the court. Thus, though a court may proceed
criminally, the contemnor in the absence of statute may be
denied some of the usual safeguards of criminal procedure.2"
The very constitutionality of such procedure was ques-
tioned in the minority opinion of Justice Rutledge in the
United Mine Workers case.26
2 Supra, n. 15.
2 Supra, n. 10.
This difficulty was noted in the leading case of Bessette v. W. B. Conkey
Co., 194 U. S. 324 (1904).
See Nelles, The Summary Power to Punish for Contempt, 31 Col. L. Rev.
956 (1931) ; see also note, 121 A. L. R. 215, following Cobb v. State, 187 Ga.
448, 200 S. E. 796, 121 A. L. R. 210 (1939).
2 United States v. United Mine Workers of America, 330 U. S. 258, 342,
363 et 8eq. (1947). Cf. Michaelson v. United States, 266 U. S. 42 (1924).
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